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Abstract: Although Ghana has made significant progress in the establishment and consolidation 
of democratic politics since 1992, the vexatious issue of the use of scarce public resources to 
support political party activities remained unresolved. Using quantitative data an attempt is made 
in this study to examine the views of Ghanaians on the arguments for and against state funding of 
political parties.  The data for the study was obtained through survey of 1600 self-declared card-
holding and 200 self-declared non-card holding members of the seven political parties that 
contested the 2012 general elections. Convenience and stratified sampling procedures were 
deployed for the selection of the respondents. The study results indicated that rich individuals with 
a mean score of 4.41 and standard deviation (SD) of 0.77 form the most predominant funding 
source for political parties in Ghana. Again, the least funding sources were the state or 
government funds and dues from ordinary party members which obtained a mean score of 2.71 
and SD of 1.71; and a mean of 2.93 and SD of 1.38, respectively. The study conclusions were that, 
in Ghana, few rich individuals are the major financiers of political parties. Ghanaians are divided 
and ambivalent on the question of state funding and, those who oppose across-the-board state 
funding policy outnumber those who support the idea. Likewise, support for state funding of 
political parties in Ghana is predominant and strongest among party executives and the smaller 
political parties. It is recommended that funding from both private and state sources require strong 
and effective regulation regime by the establishment and implementation of disclosure and 
transparency policies and laws. 
 
Keywords: State funding, political parties, card-holding, non-card holding members, Ghana 
 
Introduction   
It is important to note that the debate on state funding of political parties is indeed not new but it 
has over the last two decades gained currency following the wind of democratic reforms which 
have overwhelmed the entire world especially the developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. For 
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most developed countries which are stronger economically with a vibrant civil society and stronger 
business class, the question of party funding is not much of a problem. In fact, quite a number of 
developed countries already have party funding incorporated in their public expenditure and it 
constitutes a large share of their national income set aside for electoral and political party activities. 
However, Africa is lagging behind in terms of the number of countries providing public money to 
support political party activities (see Ohman 1999; Austin and Tjernstrom 2003). Ghana for 
example, is not among the countries currently providing state support to political parties. Ghana 
needs to invest more in nurturing, consolidating and sustaining democracy. Ghana’s current 
situation suggest that, the inherent question of whether state funding of political parties would pay-
off remained unanswered or unaddressed. In the peculiar case of Ghana, the issue is left to the 
opposition parties while the ruling party and government remained mostly unconcerned. Ninsin 
(2006) laments that, “the Ghanaian political financing regime virtually bequeaths party funding to 
market forces. He argued that, realizing effective party organization in the domain of the private 
sector has nevertheless proven illusory and problematic”.  Even the two major political parties in 
Ghana – the NPP and the NDC – have found it extremely difficult to finance their operations from 
private sources. The fact therefore is that finance is a major problem for all the political parties in 
Ghana except the party that is in power. It is therefore not surprising that all the non-governing 
parties have at one time or the other supported state subvention of political parties (Ninsin 2006). 
He has further observed that:  
“When the NPP was in opposition it was a vocal advocate of state funding of political parties. But 
since it was voted into power it has been less enthusiastic about the issue of state funding of 
political parties while the NDC, which is now out of power, has been lamenting the paucity of 
funds for party work, and has now joined the smaller parties to advocate state funding of political 
parties” (Ninsin 2006, 17-18). 
Several studies have attempted to answer the state funding question in the new democracies 
in Africa (Ninsin 2006; Ashiagbor 2005; Ayee et al. 2007; Boafo-Arthur 1996; Kumado 1996). 
Many of these studies claimed that state funding serves as an important boost to new parties 
especially smaller parties which have no or limited access to other sources of money to undertake 
their political activities (Ikstens et al. 2002). Essentially, funding provided to a new and small party 
in its infant stages may would help it not only to survive and compete in elections but to engage in 
relevant political activity during and after elections. Arguably, state funding has the tendency to 
diversify the party system, improve internal party democracy and boost democratic competition 
(Samuels 2001; Boafo-Arthur 2003). Whereas state or public funding of political parties is seen to 
be good, the extent to which state funding may bring about change in political competition is 
largely contested by many because it is dependent on how it is conceived, designed and 
implemented by the political elites of a country. Undeniably, when public funding or subsidy 
policy is well framed through consultation and massive engagement with stakeholders before 
implementation, it would strengthen the party system and urge parties to embrace political change. 
Political parties are essentially an assembly of social groups, they are products and properties of 
society; and, public funding of their activities would serve as stimulus for them in several ways. It 
would enable them to operate as professional, social and political organizations. Any carefully 
fashioned public policy aimed at supporting their activities would make them less dependent on 
rich individual businessmen and businesswomen for money. Also, public funding when packaged 
properly would help political parties build stronger structures that would improve internal 
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democracy, enhance their national and social character and enable them engage actively in social 
and political activities at all times (IDEA 2003; Ayee et al. 2007; Gyampo 2015).  
In fact, the current situation in Ghana and most African countries where the responsibility 
of funding political parties remains the concern of a small group of rich individuals and 
organizations is not the best for nurturing representative democracy and good governance.  The 
availability of appropriate funding for election campaign, headquarters and constituency 
administration and educational activities of political parties is very important. It is unfortunate that 
after nearly two and half decades of multi-party experiment in Ghana, the issue of funding of 
political parties has not been seriously discussed especially within the economic and social context, 
even though it remains a vexed and contentious political topic (Gyampo 2015; Ayee 1993; 
Kumado 1996). Public opinion on the question of state funding of political parties is still divided, 
and, despite circumstantial evidence of support for public funding of parties, there remained 
several unanswered questions on the issue in Ghana today (Gyampo 2015).  
 
Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this study was to answer the following questions:   
 What is the nature and challenges of funding political parties? 
 What is the current dominant opinion on (e.g. voters, ordinary party members and 
executives) the issue of state funding in Ghana?  
 What are some of the potential policy effects and implications of state funding?  
 
Literature review on the reasons for state funding of political parties 
Various reasons or arguments have been made in favor of state funding or public subsidy 
for political parties.  The first reason given is that state or public funding has to do with the 
increasing need to control the influence of individual and private money and to limit their potential 
effect on the democratic political process. The aim here is to protect the public good and ensure 
that the public interest rather than individual interest and money shapes the conduct of political 
parties and elected political actors. Alexander and Shiratori (1994) make a similar assertion in 
regards to the limitation placed on private donations or campaign expenditure. It is expected that 
this situation will help reduce corruption in the political process. This view is the state-centric 
perspective, and, it is regarded as a popular suggestion to solving the perennial problem of funding 
political parties where the state provides financial and non-financial resources to political parties 
from the public purse. This may be in the form of cash or kind or both.  
The second reason for state funding has to do with the realization that political parties have 
for a long time been suffering from a growing disconnection of citizens from conventional politics, 
which manifests in lack of trust in parties, identification with parties, increasing apathy and 
partisan and resultant decrease in the number of party memberships (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; 
Mair 1994; Biezen and Kopecky 2001). As a consequence, political parties have lost a significant 
number of volunteers who would have to work for the party as unpaid political missionaries or 
carrying out intensive campaign activities for free. (E.g. in Africa, the support-base of the 
nationalist political parties have diminished due to demographic changes and harsh socio-
economic conditions of the post-independence periods especially in the 1970s, 80s and 90s). This 
loss has pushed most parties to resort to the recruitment of large number of paid political-workers 
resulting in increasing cost for running party activities. This declining membership resulted in loss 
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of major revenue and membership dues/subscription causing most parties to go out of their way in 
search of financial assistance from alternative unorthodox sources. It is for this recognition that, 
some scholars and political elites are advocating an intervention from the state to prevent the 
collapse of political parties and the implications for government, governance and civil society. 
Biezen and Kopecky (2007) in this connection noted that, ‘because parties had come to be seen as 
a vital political institutions for democracy, it is just logical for the state to intervene with direct 
financial support in order to facilitate or guarantee their continued existence and survival’.  
The third reason for state involvement in party financing of political parties derives from 
the believe in the creation of an equal playing field, equal opportunities, fairness and to enhancing 
quality of political competition (Gunlicks 1993, 5). Given that all political parties are not equally 
resourceful and those who are unable to benefit from private funding should not be allowed to 
suffer unduly or be disadvantaged. This concern is of importance, particularly in regard to smaller 
and new parties whose program is unlikely to appeal to wealthy individuals and established groups 
and new parties with no connection with social and economic interests (e.g. Trade Unions, Women 
groups, farmer’s associations; youth groups and grassroots associations etc.). The justification for 
state funding in such cases is that, it would   facilitate a more equal level playing field, by enabling 
new, small and less resourceful parties to compete on a more equitable basis with the dominant 
and financially more privileged and entrenched parties. 
The fourth argument in favor of state funding relates to the desire to restrict the influence 
of private money and curtails its potential for distorting the democratic political process. The aim 
is to prevent the unfortunate situation where private financiers take an entire political party and 
party officials’ hostage resulting in dangerous manipulations and corruption. Similar arguments 
hold for the limitation placed on private donations or campaign expenditure through regulatory 
policy from the state (Alexander and Shiratori 1994; Alexander 1996). The use of public legislation 
would empower the state and its institutions to control the indiscriminate and inordinate influence 
of private-money in politics. It also offers the state a greater opportunity to legitimately exercise 
supervisory responsibility and protect undue influence of private businesses to the disadvantage of 
the ordinary members and the public interest. This notion is embedded in contemporary notion of 
the relevance of political parties for the survival of democracy (Hopkin 2004). In this regard Paltiel 
has observed as follows: “Whether the motive for state intervention is for financial stringency, the 
reduction of the burden of rising election cost, or the desire to escape the taint of corruption or 
mixture of these, efforts was made to justify the changes in terms of liberal democratic ideology” 
(quoted in Alexander 1989, 16). For the foregoing reasons, parties have become and are seen as 
indispensable public goods and the state is obliged to play a legitimate role in their survival by 
financing their activities (Biezen and Kopecky 2001; Biezen and Kopecky 2007; Paltiel 1981). 
The fifth reason is that party politics and democratic development in all modern societies 
has become increasingly expensive. The continuing rising cost of the democratic process coupled 
with a decreasing revenue to its principal actors require public funding. Politics has become 
expensive in developed and developing countries. This is because of the more use of the mass 
media, more cost-intensive campaign methods; and, resources needed by parties have increased at 
central headquarters and constituency offices and this require better staffing and more money for 
effective administration and intensive election campaign, (Mair 1994; Farrell, 2002; Pinto-
Duschinsky 1990; Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). Therefore, state funding in such a situation is never a 
luxury but necessity. 
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Despite the foregoing arguments in favor of a more prominent role of the state in the 
funding of political parties, these propositions would have to be understood within the context of 
the ongoing predominant discourse, which holds that parties make a positive contribution to 
democracy and to the public interest (Bienzen 2004; Patiel 1981; Doorenspleet 2003). In fact, the 
increasing importance being attached to state participation in party financing has become 
acceptable mainly for the recent ideological change that has accompanied the development of 
modern democracy in the developed, transition and developing countries. Political parties have 
over the years grown from organizations perceived as incompatible to democracy, to institutions 
that are generally seen not only as its principal promoters but an indispensable backbone (Bienzen 
2004; Pinto-Duschinsky 2001). 
This perceived change in the role of political parties informed Biezen and Kopecky (2007) 
submission that a growing and more generally shared and positive recognition came to be attached 
to the role of parties in representative democracy only in the immediate post-war period (Bienzen 
2004; Randallo and Svasand 2002). They argued that beginning with the restoration of democracy 
in the developed countries in central Europe, political parties came to be seen as valuable and 
crucial to the point that they are generally considered as the necessary condition for the 
organization of the modern democratic polity and for the expression of political pluralism and 
participation (Nassmacher 2001 cited in Ayee et al. 2007). Bienzen (2004) and Biezen and 
Kopecky (2007) further argued persuasively that the centrality of political parties for 
representative democracy is generally accepted both by contemporary party scholars – although 
arguably not by many political theorists – and by policy-makers charged with fostering the 
development of newly emerging democracies and with improving the quality and sustainability of 
democracy in established democracies. 
All in all, the growing appreciation over the course of the last five decades of the positive 
contribution that parties make to democratic development underline the justification for the shift 
in the theoretical postulations on the role of political parties and modern democracy. Because 
political parties have now become valued key democratic institutions, it has become necessary for 
the state to play a direct role in financing them in order to facilitate their continued existence, to 
foster equal access to resources, and to prevent personal forms of party financing (Biezen and 
Kopecky, 2007). 
 
 
Method of data collection and analysis   
Mass Survey: Questionnaire Development  
The method for data collection was mainly quantitative through mass survey of 
respondents. The development of the questionnaire was informed by the objectives of the study. 
Twenty questionnaires were pre-tested from March 24-26, 2014 in Accra.  Responses and report 
from the pre-testing were used to finalize the survey instrument. The final instrument comprised 
three sections. The first section of the questionnaire asked for information on party affiliation or 
membership status. The second section focus on the nature of sources of party funding, support 
for state funding and challenges of funding. The last section of the questionnaire collected 
information on the socio-demographic background of the respondents with respect to age, sex, 
education, occupation, income level, region and constituency.      
  
5
Sakyi and Agomor: State Funding of Political Parties in Ghana: Exploring the Views
Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University,
76 
 
Protocol for questionnaire administration  
The questionnaires were administered at various party offices, homes, party congresses and 
party programs. On Saturday April 5, 2014, the CPP held its National Executive Congress at 
Tamale, some Research Assistants were deployed to administer some number of questionnaires. 
Also, on April 12, 2014 and December 20, 2014, the opposition NPP organized its national 
delegate’s congresses at Tamale in the Northern region and Kumasi in the Ashanti region 
respectively to elect national executives of the party. The researchers took advantage of these 
congresses to administer majority of the questionnaires with the help of Research Assistants. Over 
60 percent of the total questionnaires were therefore administered at these party congresses using 
convenience and stratified sampling procedures. The stratification was done on the basis of 
membership positions of the respondents, for example, constituency, regional and national 
executives of the parties. This helped the researchers to reduce known variances in the population 
which the convenience sampling was likely to create. Likewise, Research Assistants were also 
deployed to the Western (Takoradi), Volta (Hohoe), Eartern (Donkorkrom), Brong Ahafo 
(Techima), Upper East (Bolgatanga), and Upper West (Wa) regions to administer the survey 
questionnaires. This second grouped of interviews aimed to ensure regional representation of the 
sample and to correct any potential researcher biases which might have occurred during the first 
phase. The regional distribution of the respondents are presented below in Table 1.  
The survey data covered 1600 self-declared card-holding members of the seven political 
parties that contested the 2012 general elections and 200 self-declared non-card holding members 
of the political parties. The two biggest political parties in Ghana (National Democratic Congress 
and New Patriotic Party) were allocated two-thirds of the questionnaires and the remaining one-
third were distributed among the five smaller political parties. Concerning the survey of political 
party members, the NPP and NDC were each allocated 600 questionnaires due to their almost 
equal strength in the last three general elections; and, the percentages of total votes of the five 
smaller parties in the last three elections were used as a proxy to distribute the remaining 600 
questionnaires to the respondents.   
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Table 1: Political party and region 
  Region of affiliation34  
Party  N/R WR CR GAR VR ER AR BAR NR UEW UWR Total 
NPP 17 29 11 117 63 68 95 36 91 31 42 600 
NDC 32 29 33 104 43 38 118 27 72 55 49 600 
CPP 1 8 11 35 6 7 20 10 30 11 9 148 
PNC 2 8 7 47 9 3 16 10 39 20 16 177 
PPP 0 6 5 1 2 1 2 4 11 6 5 43 
GCPP 0 3 0 6 0 2 7 6 0 1 1 26 
UFP 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 6 
N/A 13 30 8 74 4 3 44 17 5 1 1 200 
Total 65 113 75 384 127 122 304 114 248 125 123 1800 
Source: Compiled from survey data, 2014 
  
 In June 2014, 100 questionnaires were sent to Parliament House and distributed to MPs out 
of which 90 were completed and returned. Most of the questionnaires were self-administered. 
Therefore, there were many non-responses to some of the questions. For example, over 40 percent 
of the questionnaires from parliament did not provide information on their regions and 
constituencies. Given that we have only one MP for each constituency, such information would 
compromise anonymity of the responses.  Respondents who failed to indicate their party affiliation 
and the major source of funding to their parties were not included in the sample. This is because 
the main aim of the study is to identify major sources of funding to political parties in Ghana. The 
positions occupied by respondents in their parties is shown below in table 2.   
 
Table 2: Membership positions of respondents of political parties 
 NPP NDC CPP PNC PPP GCPP UFP N/A Total 
Member of 
Parliament 
56 60 4 1 0 0 0 0 121 
National 
Executive 
9 14 4 4 1 2 0 0 34 
Regional 
Executive 
37 36 30 9 6 0 0 0 118 
Constituency 
Executive 
263 262 27 40 12 4 3 0 611 
Polling Station 
Executive 
72 82 42 25 5 5 1 0 232 
                                
43 Respondents were selected across all the ten regions of Ghana namely Western Region (WR), Central Region (CR), Greater Accra Region 
(GAR), Volta Region (VR), Eastern Region (ER), Ashanti Region (AR) Brong Ahafo Region (BAR), Northern Region (NR), Upper East Region 
(UER) and Upper West Region (UWR). Sixty-five of the survey respondents did not indicate the region in which their constituencies are located 
(N/R). 
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TESCON/TEIN 
Executive 
54 40 2 3 0 0 0 0 99 
Council of Elders 9 3 2 1 0 2 0 0 17 
Overseas Branch 
Executive 
0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Ordinary Member 100 100 36 94 19 13 2 0 364 
No Party 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 200 
 Total 600 600 148 177 43 26 6 200 1800 
Source: Compiled from survey data, 2014 
Data analysis procedure 
Word-Excel and the Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) version 20.0 were 
the computer software used for analyzing the quantitative data.  Word-Excel was used to develop 
tables, figures and charts. The statistical results are presented in the form of percentages, frequency 
tables and cross-tabulations.   
 
Characteristics of survey respondents 
The background of the respondents for the study in relation to the demographic statistics 
such as gender, age groupings, educational levels and occupations are presented below in table 3. 
The survey was dominated by male respondents who formed over 60% of the total respondents. 
The predominant age group was those aged between 31 to 40 years with the average age being 
approximately 38 years. With respect to the educational level of the respondents, most of them had 
a form of tertiary education. Thus about 63% of the respondents had either completed a university, 
a teacher training college or any other form of tertiary education.  
Majority of respondents were employed and out of these about 34% were employees of 
private businesses. The government employees constituted about 28% of the total number of 
respondents.  Majority of the respondents were mainly Christian (over 60% of the total 
respondents).  See Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Demographic characteristics of respondents 
Item  
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of 
respondents 
Gender   
No response 103 5.72% 
Male  1110 61.67% 
Female 587 32.61% 
Age grouping   
No response 22 1.22% 
18-30 years 481 26.72% 
31-40 years 582 32.33% 
41-50 years 450 25.00% 
51-60 years 217 12.06% 
60 years and above 48 2.67% 
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Educational level    
Non response 35 1.94% 
No formal education 62 3.44% 
Primary education 46 2.56% 
JHS 138 7.67% 
SHS 385 21.39% 
Tertiary  1134 63.00% 
Occupation   
No response 52 2.89% 
Artisan 234 13.00% 
Employed by the state 509 28.28% 
Employed by a private business 618 34.33% 
Unemployed 387 21.50% 
Average monthly income   
No response 286 15.89% 
Less than 500 512 28.44% 
500-2000 745 41.39% 
2001-4000 132 7.33% 
4001-6000 57 3.17% 
Above 6000 68 3.78% 
Religion  0.00% 
N/R 42 2.33% 
Traditional 38 2.11% 
Christian 1126 62.56% 
Islam 589 32.72% 
Others 5 0.28% 
        Source: Compiled from survey data, 2014 
  
Results of the study 
The nature and challenges of funding of political parties 
In this section the key questions of the study, that is, the nature, challenges and state 
funding of political parties were examined using statistical tests from the survey data. The results 
are presented in the sub-sections which follows. 
 
The nature of funding political parties 
Respondents were made to rate on a scale of one to five, their levels of agreement of each 
of the identified sources of funding for political parties. The scores were averaged out across all 
the respondents thereby giving scores ranging from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5. Given in 
Table 4 are the available sources of funding for the political parties. As shown in Table 4, the most 
predominant funding sources for the political parties as noted by the respondents were from rich 
individuals of the party (Mean = 4.41, SD = 0.77). Other dominant sources of party funding came 
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from founding members, members of parliament and other executive members of the party. The 
least identified funding source was related to the state or government funds (Mean = 2.71, SD = 
1.71) and the ordinary members (Mean = 2.93, SD = 1.38).  
Analysis of variance tests show that differences exist in the dominance of the funding 
sources as perceived by the respondents (p<0.01). Further post hoc tests using the Tukey’s HSD 
procedure illustrates that the actual differences occurred between sources of funding from rich 
individuals and all other sources of funding. Similarly, differences existed between the ratings of 
the sources of funding from ordinary members and all the other sources of funding. The details of 
the post hoc tests are as given in Table 5 below.  
 
Table 4: Sources of funding for political parties 
Source of funding Average Standard deviation  
Rich individuals of the party 4.41 0.77 
Founding members 4.06 1.02 
Members of parliament 4.04 1.11 
Executive members of the party 3.94 0.9 
Contributions from overseas branches 3.84 1.17 
Local businessmen/businesswomen 3.83 1.59 
Foreign businesses 3.24 1.44 
Ordinary Members  2.93 1.38 
State/Government funds 2.71 1.71 
           Source: Compiled from survey data, 2014 
  
Table 5: pairwise differences for post hoc tests 
Funding source OM RI FM LB MP SGF EM OB 
RI 1.48*        
FM 1.13* 0.35*       
LB 0.91* 0.57* 0.22*      
MP 0.90* 0.58* 0.23* 0.01     
SGF 0.21* 1.69* 1.34* 1.13* 1.11*    
EM 1.11* 0.37* 0.02 0.19* 0.21* 1.32   
OB 1.01* 0.47* 0.12 0.10 0.11 1.23* 0.10  
FB 0.31* 1.17* 0.82* 0.60* 0.59* 0.53* 0.80* 0.70* 
 * Pairwise Difference is significant; Source: Compiled from survey data, 2014  
Key 
OM - Ordinary members of the party      RI - Rich individuals of the party 
FM – Foreign Members of the party        LB - Local Businessmen/ Businesswomen 
MP – Members of parliament                  SGF – State/ government funds 
EM - executive members of the party      OB – Overseas Branches 
FB – Foreign Businesses 
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Difficulties to mobilize funds by political parties   
Four items were used to identify the challenges faced by the political parties. An 
exploratory factor analysis was conducted to identify the major categories that contain the 
challenges faced by the political parties in mobilising funds. The tests for model adequacy yielded 
significant results as the Bartlett’s test of model adequacy yielded a p value less than 0.01. This 
indicates that the sample selected is adequate for factor analysis. The factor analysis extracted two 
factors that explained 69% of the total variation present within the data set. Table 5 provides details 
of the factor loadings on the two distinct factors.  
The first factor extracted explained 39% of the total variation. This factor contained 
challenges that were related to institutional flaws within the party. This includes the issue of 
corruption, lack of accountability and the presence of weak organisational capacity to mobilise 
funds for the political party. The second factor extracted approximately 30% of the total variation. 
Within this factor were issues that are related to the ordinary members of the party. This includes 
the issues that are related to financial weakness of the ordinary members and their fear of being 
victimised by other members of the party.  
Further tests were conducted to examine the existence of substantial differences between 
the two identified factors. An independent samples t-test conducted yielded significant differences 
between the severity of the challenges resulting from the institutional factors and the challenges 
resulting from the weakness of the ordinary members (p<0.01). Institutional challenges were found 
to be more severe than the challenges that were related to the weaknesses of the ordinary members. 
 
Table 6: Factor analysis of challenges of mobilising funds 
 Loadings on Factors 
challenge of mobilising funds Institutional factors 
Ordinary member 
weakness 
Lack of transparency and accountability  .850 .121 
Weak organizational capacity to mobilize 
funds from ordinary members 
.828 .175 
Ordinary members fear political victimisation .140 .800 
Ordinary members are financially poor .141 .800 
Source: Compiled from survey data, 2014 
 
Respondent perceptions on party financing 
Respondents were also asked to indicate their views generally on financing political parties. 
Four items were identified for the respondents to respond to. In each case they were made to state 
their level of agreement to the identified items. Table 6 provides the responses based on the 
percentage of respondents that agreed to the identified item on party financing. Further a sample 
chi square test was used to test for the significance of the differences among the proportions of the 
identified items.  
As shown in table 7, respondents believed that wealthy people within the party tend to 
influence the outcome of the elections. In addition, respondents were generally of the view that 
sources of funds should be made by the political parties. With regards to the moneys given to 
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parties by individuals as donations, respondents were generally of the view that the state must not 
limit the amount to be donated.  
A further breakdown was made to ascertain whether the general perceptions of party financing 
varied across executive members and ordinary members. The chi square tests still yielded similar 
results as it was when individuals were not considered. Similarly, the perceptions on party 
financing did not differ when categories of party affiliation was considered. This is to say that the 
general perceptions of party financing are independent of one’s portfolio within a political party 
and the party affiliation (see tables 6 and 7). 
 
Table 7: General perceptions of party funding 
 % disagree 
% 
neutral  
% 
agree 
Chi square p 
value 
 Wealthy people who provide money for the 
party tend to influence the outcome of 
elections within the party 
12.9 10.1 76.6 0.00* 
 Parties should fully disclose sources of 
income 
13.8 12.5 72.5 0.00* 
 Political parties should fully disclose to the 
public their expenditure 
13.3 12.9 73.2 0.00* 
 The State should limit the amount of money 
that individual citizens and companies can 
donate to parties 
44.6 20.7 34.3 0.00* 
Source:  Compiled from survey data, 2014 
 
State funding of political parties 
Respondents were asked to state whether they were in support of state funding of political 
parties or not. Approximately 42% of the respondents were in support of state funding of political 
parties whilst 38% were not in favour. The remaining 18% were left undecided. Tables 8 and 9 
provides cross tabulations between support of state funding and the political party preference as 
well as support of state funding and the position held in the party. A binomial test of the 
significance of the proportions yielded significant differences between the proportions of those 
who are in support, those not in support and the respondents who were undecided. This test 
considers the null hypothesis of equal representation of respondents within the three categories.  
 
Table 8: Political party funding and political party affiliation cross tabulation 
   Party funding items 
Party affiliation A B C D 
NPP 
% disagree 15.7 19.0 18.2 51.3 
% neutral  10.0 18.2 18.5 23.5 
% agree 74.3 61.8 63.0 24.8 
NDC 
% disagree 12.5 12.3 12.0 43.0 
% neutral  10.2 12.2 10.7 21.7 
% agree 77.0 74.8 76.8 34.8 
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CPP 
% disagree 4.7 7.4 6.8 29.7 
% neutral  6.1 6.1 5.4 18.9 
% agree 88.5 84.5 87.2 51.4 
PNC 
% disagree 5.6 4.5 4.0 42.9 
% neutral  7.9 .6 2.8 7.9 
% agree 86.4 94.4 92.1 49.2 
Others 
% disagree 20.0 13.3 14.7 40.0 
% neutral  9.3 16.0 13.3 9.3 
% agree 70.7 69.3 72.0 50.7 
                   Source: Compiled from survey data, 2014 
Table 9: Political party funding and portfolio cross tabulation 
    Party funding items 
Portfolio A B C D 
Executive 
member 
% disagree 13.7 13.1 12.7 46.8 
% neutral 9.7 13.1 12.2 19.3 
% agree 76.5 72.9 74.6 33.7 
Ordinary 
member 
% disagree 8.8 15.1 14.3 37.9 
% neutral 8.5 11.5 12.9 22.5 
% agree 82.4 72.3 72.3 39.0 
                        Source: Compiled from survey data, 2014 
 
Chi square tests for independence show that support for state funding of political parties depends 
on political party preference (p<0.05). As seen from table 9, the proportion of respondents who 
are either in favour of state funding across the CPP, PNC and the other smaller parties far 
outweighs the proportion of respondents in the NPP and NDC parties that support state funding. 
This pre supposes that the support of state funding of political parties is predominant among the 
smaller political parties.  
 
Table 10: State funding support and political party preference cross tabulation 
Support state 
funding 
  political party   
  NPP NDC CPP PNC Others Total 
do not support 
Number of respondents 241 260 42 37 32 612 
% within support 48.4% 50.9% 38.5% 28.0% 46.4% 46.4% 
support 
Number of respondents 257 251 67 95 37 707 
% within party1 51.6% 49.1% 61.5% 72.0% 53.6% 53.6% 
 Number of respondents 498 511 109 132 69 1319 
% within party1 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source:  Compiled from survey data, 2014 
 
Table 11: State funding support and party portfolio cross tabulation 
State funding   Portfolio Total 
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support   Executive member Ordinary member 
Do not support 
Number of respondents 450 162 612 
% within portfolio 43.1% 58.7% 46.4% 
Support 
Number of respondents 593 114 707 
% within portfolio 56.9% 41.3% 53.6% 
Total  Number of respondents 1043 276 1319 
  % within portfolio 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Compiled from survey data, 2014 
Similar tests for independence show that the support for the state funding of political parties 
is rather dependent on the portfolio of the respondents based on whether the person is an ordinary 
member or not. The results further indicate that the proportion of party portfolio holders in favour 
of state funding outweighs the proportion of ordinary members who are in favour of the support 
of state funding. This shows that ordinary members of political parties are not in favour of state 
funding of political parties whilst executive members of political parties are in favour of state 
funding of political parties.  
Cconclusions and policy lessons 
This study examined the vexed question of state funding of political parties through statistical 
analysis. Based on the results of the study the following conclusions were drawn: 
 In Ghana, few rich individuals are the major financiers of political parties. Funding from 
foreigners is becoming a common and acceptable practice especially within the bigger 
parties. The second reliable source of funding comes from founding members and 
executive members of the party. Membership dues and public funding are not only the least 
but an unpredictable source of funds to political parties. 
 Ghanaians are divided and ambivalent on the question of state funding. Those who oppose 
across-the-board state funding policy outnumber those who support the idea.  
 The statistical results showed that support for state funding of political parties is 
predominant among the smaller political parties.  
 Support for state funding is strongest among party executives, but for ordinary party 
members state funding of political parties is an undesirable policy option at this time. What 
one could deduce from the statistical results is that state funding is seen by ordinary party 
members as a bad policy but private funding especially by rich individuals is seen to be a 
more preferred option. Both private and state funding, however, need effective regulation 
by the establishment and implementation of disclosure and transparency policies and laws. 
 Finally, the institutional weaknesses within the parties are responsible for their failure to 
mobilize resources for party activities. These weaknesses include corruption, lack of 
accountability and transparency in funds management, and weak organizational capacity 
to mobilize funds. 
 
Policy lessons and recommendations 
 The study results have shown that the Ghanaian public remained indecisive and are 
unlikely to support any blanket policy of state funding of political parties. Rather, 
Ghanaians would prefer a more pragmatic policy strategy where both state and non-state 
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actors would be encouraged to support political parties with the necessary financial and 
non-financial resources to effectively perform their interest articulation and financial 
mobilization functions.  
 It is also recommended that political parties introduce appropriate and aggressive measures 
and policies which support a transparent and accountable regime for managing all political 
party funds. Indeed, improving transparency and accountability in the activities of political 
parties may not only reduce corruption; it would gradually increase public confidence in 
the internal party politics and system and the entire electoral political process. 
Transparency and accountability in the use of public resources are central principles which 
must guide the decisions of all political party actors at local and national levels.  
 This study also recommends that public dialogue on the issue of state funding would have 
to be intensified throughout the country since the issue is far from resolution. It is suggested 
that the relevant Civil Society Organizations be given the necessary support to facilitate 
healthy debate between the proponents and opponents of state funding of political parties.   
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